The Bedouins of al-Qasr claim that they 62
428 follow the Islamic laws of inheritance, in which case, a
562 surviving daughter is entitled to one-half the share of a surviving son (Quran IV: 177). But, in only two cases did
[423] women own land in al-Qasr: one woman was the only close survivor of her father, and, the other woman was a widow without sons. In fact, my informant even admitted that these cases were exceptional, that the women were permitted to keep the land only because the brothers of the deceased men, who are the "rightful heirs" after the sons, did not want the land. The Bedouins insist, on the other hand, that a girl can claim her share of the inheritance: "It is her right." But she will never do such a thing "because she respects her brothers too much to accept the land which is offered to her."

428 When the father's estate is large, certain measures are taken to divide it between his sons. In some cases, the division may be somewhat complex and determined over a period of time. One example of this in al-Qasr involved a wealthy man whose own property was divisible into parts roughly corresponding to ecological subdivisions. The subdivisions of the estate became the shares of the sons, and could then be separated but remain symbiotically dependent. Ecological relationships affirm social relations. The following is an
[159] account of inheritance rules in al-Qasr:

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•159 I am 45 years old and my eldest brother is 53 years old. I have two younger brothers. When my father died, we four sons inherited the property of our father jointly. I told my older brother to divide the land the way in which he wanted . . . My father had divided his land into four parts before he died. Each part was a separate "farm" so that a son could raise barley or olives, as he liked . . . But my brother told me to make the decision. As it turned out, my youngest brother was the first to make his choice of the four parts. He took his land but we still kept all of our sheep together. One year later, my older brother took his share of the land, but Jabril (the next to the youngest brother) and I remained together, and still remain together. Some men want to be on their own and others do not. Our eldest brother was the first to separate his animals from the collective herd . . . When the decisions were made to divide the land between us, we got the local "holy man" to go around the area with us and to witness the boundaries. This is done so that later if a brother changes his mind, or wants to take different land, the true borders will be known. We recorded them on paper and the "holy man" knows them . . . In matters of inheritance, all sons get equal shares, but in a case where there are ten camels and three sons, then, each gets three camels and the tenth goes to the eldest brother.

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562 Any property which a female may own, if it is land
[431] or livestock, will go to her sons upon her death. In al-Qasr, such property will usually be sheep which a woman may accumulate through gift-giving. In one case, which is unique in al-Qasr, a woman received thirteen camels from her husband
[583] at the time of her wedding. (This was not the brideprice, for that goes to the bride's father.) At the time of her death her camels numbered seventy, and they were divided equally among her five sons. Concerning lesser items, such as clothing and jewelry, and also chickens, these are

582 [584] she could marry no man.

582 578 Most of the older Bedouins say that bint 'amm marriage as it is practiced in the desert is an evil, that it causes nothing but trouble. They say that if there are bad feelings between two men they will place claims upon each other's sister with the intention of preventing the girls from ever marrying. The younger Bedouins say that "it is better to marry the bint 'amm than to let a stranger take her." The [182] [571] claim on the bint 'amm, of course, should be seen as a basis for social relationships between groups, regardless of any [586] conflict it may or may not lead to. This is why the Bedouins say that a man "will never divorce his bint 'amm, because if he does that means that she is no good." It follows, then, that if "she is no good" none of her other paternal cousins will marry her. Implicit here is the reference to the making [182] and breaking of group ties. Similarly, to regulate and to maximize kinship ties, a man can claim only one of his father's brother's daughters. In the case where there is only one bint 'amm, her eldest cousin has first claim to her. 582 578 This sometimes causes conflict between brothers as the following informant's story indicates. • 159

> The father of Salih and Aziz was dead which meant that Aziz, being the elder, would have to furnish the brideprice if Salih were to marry first. In fact, Salih wanted to marry his bint 'amm. Aziz refused him permission to do so: Aziz had first claim to the bint 'amm, and, also, he thought that the brideprice which

582 her father was asking was too high. Salih was angry,
578 so angry that he swore to kill any man who tried to
take his bint 'amm. He went away to the Nile Valley
• 159 to earn enough money to pay the high brideprice. In
the meantime, the cousin of the brothers came and
paid Aziz for the permission to marry the girl. Salih
returned, but, of course, he could not kill his own
paternal cousin. He became ill and went into a sleep
which lasted for three days. Salih had always been
known for his powerful voice but when he awoke he had
a very weak voice. Salih never spoke to his brother
again. He died seven years ago without every marrying.

582 This story has aprocryphal aspects which announce this to be
578 an important issue in Bedouin culture. The subject of parallel-
829 cousin marriage is a complex one surrounded by controversy and
contradiction. The older Bedouins say that the practice is a
[182] source of conflict, but they will usually insist that at
least one of their sons marry his bint 'amm to insure the
corporate link with the brother. In support of their com-
plaints, they say that bint 'amm marriage is not morally
sanctioned: "We do not like it and it is not right. But
if we try to stop our sons from taking their cousins they
will put a gun on their shoulder and go after her." On the
other hand, this is contrasted with the complaints of the
elders that their sons no longer respect their marriage habits,
that they are marrying anyone these days: "Our sons resent the
bint 'amm marriage because it is an agreement between fathers."
582 While I was in the field, three marriages took place; one was
with the bint 'amm, and the other two were outside the secondary
group but within the primary group, i.e., inter-lineage.

156 than the Awlad 'Ali societal level. In the traditional
554 system, his influence and power have been informal, and,
121 although this has been advantageous over against the formal role of 'aqila, his political activity was ultimately limited by this structural differentiation and definition of authority. [177] In gaining access to the bureaucratic structure of Egyptian officialdom with its firm allocation of rights and duties, Hajj 'Ali could operate as an authority within the total authority structure which has reference to both the internal and external political relational systems of al-Qasr.

Practical Application

*613 In al-Qasr, the two most influential and powerful lineages, 'Ailit Lazumi and 'Ailit Ma'fas, each have a [634] "most powerful bait." We have noted that in 'Ailit Lazumi it is Bait Bu Taram which controls the office of 'umda: in *613 'Ailit Ma'fas it is Bait 'Umar which has Hajj 'Ali. Hajj 'Ali •159 is fifty three years old. He has married five times, divorced 581 one wife, and at present has four wives. Whatever his motives 156 for these marriages, at least some of them have obviously [595] been made as economic and political moves. A check on his wives' tribal origins will show this. In each case, Hajj 'Ali's wife is from a lineage which holds land contiguous to his own property in the 'izba sector of al-Qasr. The one exception to this is a marriage contracted to establish ties

*613 with Bait Bu Taram of 'Ailit Lazumi. These marriages and
•159 their resultant alliances enhance the political power and
581 social status of Hajj 'Ali within and without al-Qasr.
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Although he has no education himself, and neither reads
159 nor writes, Hajj 'Ali has sent his son to the University of
156 Alexandria. Hajj 'Ali's son is the only boy from al-Qasr
873 ever to attend the university. Hajj 'Ali desired that his
[212] son study law at the university or enter the military academy "and become an officer." But his son objected to this, saying: "Either way I will be employed by the government and will not be permitted to travel and see other countries." Hajj 'Ali did not argue with this: he said that his son should study what he wished. The son is now studying in the Faculty of Commerce
156 at Alexandria. Hajj 'Ali is also sending his daughters to
159 the primary school in al-Qasr. Not all of the Bedouins believe
872 that girls should receive an education.
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156 Hajj 'Ali places among the "status group" in terms
159 of wealth. Although he has now committed himself to olive-
554 farming as a way of life, he remains one of the biggest sheep
472 owners in al-Qasr. Therefore, he is identified with both traditional and modern symbols of status. Hajj 'Ali differs in
156 one important way from other members of the "status group"
159 in that he owns three small general stores, two in al-Qasr
554 and one far to the west in Sallum. This fact has several
443 significant implications. Shops in al-Qasr (there are five
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*[613]

156 of them) cater largely to the needs of the lineage in whose
159 territory they are located. They are operated mostly on a
554 credit basis. Lineage members, as debtors, feel gratitude
443 but also, and more importantly, loyalty toward their kinsman
423 and creditor. Hajj 'Ali is the only member of al-Qasr who
472 owns two shops, and the only Bedouin in the whole Western Desert
[613] who owns three shops. His brother owns a shop in Matruh.
[452] Furthermore, the shop in Sallum is in a strategic position on
156 the Libyan border which, coincidentally or not, is a point
159 for importing, and also smuggling, foreign goods into Egypt.
554 The possession and utilization of foreign products is definitely
443 a status symbol all over Egypt. Hence, the person in this
439 area who can control, however slightly, the distribution of
472 such goods has a lever with which to exact prestige and
favors from the "status group" in al-Qasr who now welcome
these symbols (tobacco, pistols, rifles, radios) and the
bureaucrats of Marsa Matruh who crave them (food goods,
clothing materials, car parts).

156 Besides all this, Hajj 'Ali is involved in a small
159 stone-cutting operation which supplies stones for house
554 building, he cooperates with his three brothers in a well-
[316] cleaning concern, and contracts government heavy equipment
[312] to build earth dams. The material evidence of his status
[427] is that he is the only man in al-Qasr with two compound-type
[342] houses (one he built thirteen years ago), and the only man
[595] with four wives.

156 with four wives. It is not hard to understand why the people
•159 of al-Qasr consider Hajj 'Ali a rajal khair par excellence.
554 For instance, when I asked one man it he could give me some
627 examples of court cases, he replied: "The one who is not an
124 'aqila pays no attention to anything save getting food for his children. The rajal khair has money and men (a reference to the "old days" when a person needed cohorts for battle), and so he always pays instead of us. He lends us money and helps us in doing anything, like Hajj 'Ali does." In another
124 interview, one man showed great respect for Hajj 'Ali's tradi-
156 tional status and modern ability to deal with the outside
159 world by giving him the honorific title of "shaikh," and
554 showing that the Bedouins of al-Qasr put their trust in him:
439 "When the olive merchants come from Alexandria, they go to
472 Shaikh 'Ali, someone who knows about olives. They ask him
245 what kind of olives al-Qasr has. He shows the merchants, and they say: 'I will give you so much for them.' They make an agreement, and Hajj 'Ali collects the olives and gets the price for them."

156 In terms of local politics, I would guess, but do
159 not have data to prove, that Hajj 'Ali was the third party
554 most frequently referred to in seeking a termination of
[627] conflict. He was commonly asked to participate in these
[114] matters not only by the disputants themselves but also by the 'aqila or other third party presiding. He was sometimes

He was sometimes asked to sit-in as a witness for important contractual matters. Note that in the rawaabit al-'awaaqil of Bait Shafaila of 'Ailit Lazumi (presented in Chapter Four), Hajj 'Ali who is neither from 'Ailit Lazumi nor an 'aqila was present to sign and validate this document.

Hajj 'Ali, then, operates in the micropolitical system and the traditional authority structure of al-Qasr. But what is just as important, he has secured a firm foothold in the modern bureaucratic structure of the near-by town. He straddles both camps. The Governor of Marsa Matruh was an important aid to my understanding of Hajj 'Ali's role as "broker." The Governor claimed that the British first introduced the roles of 'umda and shaikh; they did this to "control the Bedouin" and to "get the men out of the tents." He explained in his own way what he considered to be the structural differentiation of political roles in al-Qasr.

> Let me tell you, these fellows are very clever. They have an 'umda . . . he comes to my office and says: "I want this and this." I say, "No." Then he goes back to the 'awaqil and tells them that, and then these fellows begin to think in what way they can get what they want. But the 'umda is nothing; it is the 'aqila whom the Bedouins listen to and love . . . The 'umda is elected (at this time) by the Bedouins. They put forward a man who hesitates, one who can say yes or no . . . But there is a real leader for the people, this is a man such as Hajj 'Ali, here is a man the Bedouins love.

The Governor said that Hajj 'Ali speaks well and thinks well. Twice in the interview the Governor said that

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Hajj 'Ali "became an 'aqila by his way of life." Of course, the fact is that Hajj 'Ali is not an 'aqila at all. Although I feel that the Governor should understand the Bedouin authority structure, he is not alone in his misconceptions. The chief agricultural engineer for the G.D.D.O., who works very closely with the Bedouins of al-Qasr, also thought that Hajj 'Ali was the 'aqila of Bait 'Umar in 'Ailit Ma'fas. Furthermore, and most impressive of all, one 'aqila in 'Ailit Dawlat and his four sons all thought that Hajj 'Ali was the 'aqila of Bait 'Umar. There is more here than just ignorance of Bedouin society on the part of officials, and disinterest on the part of the Dawlat 'aqila. There is good reason for these different parties to mistake Hajj 'Ali as a key traditional "authority," or spokesman for his corporate group. It seems clear that in their respective dealings they must have encountered Hajj 'Ali in some kind of representative capacity. The 'aqila who insisted that Hajj 'Ali was an 'aqila, even after I pointed out that he was not, lived outside the 'izba sector and hence mistook an important rajal khair for an 'aqila. The Governor understandably mistook the most influential man in al-Qasr as an 'aqila.

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There are other traits which qualify Hajj 'Ali as the singular leader of the Bedouins. A few years back, the Governor of Marsa Matruh formed a Governor's Council (Majlis al-Muhafza) made up of representatives of the Bedouin

635 [648] population of the whole Western Desert, and representatives of the Egyptian government employees working in the province. [634] The Bedouin representatives appointed to this council need not be an 'umda or a shaikh, although they may be. The oldest Bedouin member of the council, who happens to be an 'umda, told me that "the Governor picks the men who he feels understand the problems of the people."

635 124 *613 The Governor himself thinks that every Bedouin on his council is an 'aqila. He replied to my question about the criteria for membership on the Majlis al-Muhafza: "I am using a new selection system. Rather than choose the 'umda or shaikh, I choose the 'aqila. Every man on the council is an 'aqila, and the number is determined by the population of the area . . . But I appoint more men from the [619] 'Ali Ahmar (see Figures 3 and 7)[1] than from other tribes. This is because they are more numerous, and they are near Matruh where I am able to contact them immediately. The 'Ali Ahmar are represented by six men and the other tribes by just three men."

156 •159 554 635 648 [114] Hajj 'Ali is one of these six men and the only member of the Council who resides in al-Qasr. I attended and observed the December meeting of the Council. The Governor sat at the head of a long table with the Egyptian representatives on either side of him. At the other end of the table sat the Bedouin representatives, Hajj 'Ali among them. Purely

1. [See pp. 65 & 77 respectively--Analyst]

156 administrative business took up most of the time at the
159 meeting, and only the Governor and the Egyptians took part
554 in the discussion. At the conclusion of the meeting, the
635 Governor asked if any present had comments to make. Hajj
648 'Ali rose, and delivered a formal and well-prepared speech
871 on the inadequacies of the educational facilities in Matruh.
537 He noted that the Governor had promised the Bedouins that if they sent their sons in from the desert for secondary schooling, their material needs would be taken care of, but that in fact the Governor had not kept his promise for there was not enough space and beds for the boys. The Governor apologized for this condition and said he was trying to correct it. I noted that a few Egyptians found something amusing about this incident, but that all of the Bedouins present were serious and nodded in agreement with the points made by Hajj 'Ali.

156 We should note that Hajj 'Ali was the only Bedouin to
159 speak up at the meeting, that he spoke in the formal, tradi-
554 tional manner, and that he showed concern for the real problems
635 of the Bedouins. Hajj 'Ali is careful to protect his identity as a Bedouin, and in this he differs from the 'umda and most of the "status group."

121 In situations of induced change, the cultural problems
156 involved differ in their conception and immediacy as defined
159 by the agents and the recipients of change. Hajj 'Ali, who
564 is both an agent and a recipient of change, is intimate with
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121 156 159 554 635 177 the problems of the Bedouins of al-Qasr. He knows how to phrase them, and his place on the Majlis al-Muhafza gives him the right and the opportunity to air them. This is the role of the "cultural broker." Before the meeting of the council, Hajj 'Ali had gathered a group of the men from al-Qasr and they had talked about which demands should be presented to the Governor. This is purely a political process which Hajj 'Ali manipulates. The formulation and presentation [48] of demands became, in the hands of Hajj 'Ali, "inputs" into the Egyptian political system with the hope that they will materialize as "outputs" and the satisfaction of needs - to use the terminology of David Easton's "systems analysis" (1965b).

156 159 554 635 177 On another occasion, Hajj 'Ali demonstrated his status and political leadership and the fact that he has assumed the position of spokesman for the Bedouin of al-Qasr during this period of change. Once each year the Governor makes a tour of al-Qasr to inspect the school, the cooperative building, the government experimental farm, and the area in general. After the inspection tour, he holds a reception in a ceremonial tent set up for the occasion. At this time, he states his evaluations and opinions, distributes some clothing material to the poorer families of the area, and asks for suggestions from the Bedouins who sit on the ground before the tent. The only suggestion forthcoming from the Bedouins was

156 by the secretary of the cooperative society who requested
159 that the government furnish bus service between Matruh and
554 al-Qasr. The Governor thought this a good idea and said he
635 would inquire into the matter.
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156 As the Governor suggested that the meeting be adjourned,
159 Hajj 'Ali stood up, faced the Governor and began another of
554 his formal speeches in the rich tradition of Arabic; it was
635 the best Arabic I had heard spoken in the desert. This speech
177 was for the benefit of all present, Bedouins and officials
537 alike. Hajj 'Ali made no requests but simply thanked the Governor for honoring al-Qasr with his presence. In this short well-prepared tribute, he said:

> We feel the efforts of the government and we can scarcely imagine or dream of this development. For instance, we were living in tents and now only five per cent remain in tents while the remainder are in houses. We were dressed simply, but now we are dressed in poplin material. Those who could afford one set of clothes now can afford two. Thanks be to God, all this is due to Jamal Abd al-Nasser.

156 It is significant, of course, that smiles once again
159 played on the faces of the Governor's entourage and nothing
554 but admiration on the faces of the Bedouins. As Hajj 'Ali
635 spoke he did not face the Governor directly but turned aside,
537 speaking both to him and the Bedouins--Hajj 'Ali, the Bedouin,
had been sitting on the ground before the Governor. The
[634] 'umda and shaikh had accompanied the Governor on his tour

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159 and they sat on chairs inside the tent. I returned to
554 Marsa Matruh in the 'umda's car (1964 Ford, highly polished)
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537 with the 'umda and the shaikh. They openly joked about Hajj
634 'Ali and his manner of presentation; they repeated some of
122 his "stilted" phrases and laughed. Hajj 'Ali gave last year's
522 reception speech also. This is because, his son says, Hajj
'Ali is considered a fine speaker by the Bedouins of al-Qasr.

121 We can see how these details carry larger implications
177 within the context of political and social structures under-
178 going change. It is the stuff which the anthropologist finds
important for an understanding of the process of change.

156 If I have established thus far that Hajj 'Ali is
159 politically active and representative in both the traditional
554 and the modern systems, then the attempt is now to prove that
177 he consciously seeks to change the traditional in the direction
178 of the modern for political and moral reasons, and for social
and personal reasons.

156 Hajj 'Ali, when he spoke with me, inevitably came
159 around to the subject of international politics, whether this
554 was the question of Israel or the image which America's racial
177 problems presented. Hajj 'Ali was the only man from the whole
178 Marsa Matruh area who was neither shaikh nor 'umda to attend
124 the nomination of Jamal Abd al-Nasser in January of 1965. In
829 all of this, I detect a move on the part of Hajj 'Ali to
571 identify himself with an Egyptian reference group and to

draw al-Qasr into the Egyptian political community. He has committed himself to work hand-in-hand with the Governor of Marsa Matruh in introducing changes connected with economics and education into al-Qasr. He does not conceal this fact. When I spoke with him about helping me with my study of changing attitudes in al-Qasr, he said: "I might have the time to do this, but before I decide you will have to bring me a letter from the Governor stating that he wishes me to cooperate with you." The identity and responsibility which Hajj 'Ali feels for his role of agent of change is indicated in his remark to me that he had heard "there were others in the desert who feel and think the way I myself do."

Hajj 'Ali is discretely aware of the status difference between himself, as a member of the "status group," and the others of al-Qasr. As Weber would say, he perceives the difference in "style of life." I was invited to Hajj 'Ali's house for 'iid al-fitr, the feast marking the end of Ramadan. I thought that this would be a good opportunity to observe the "leaders" of al-Qasr together. I was very much surprised to find present no members of the "status group" but only their exact opposites. On the occasion of this feast it is the custom that the rich treat the poor. As an additional surprise, we had a very simple meal of bread, dates, peanuts, and tea. Hajj 'Ali explained to me: "My neighbors do not have my economic advantages, and I do not think it is proper

156 to serve other than what they eat." Hajj 'Ali is not only
159 conscious of social stratification in his society, but he also
554 has a great deal of empathy with the less endowed, a pre-
571 requisite of a traditional Bedouin leader and an advantageous
574 one for a modern leader.
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He is aware of most traditional institutions and how
156 they relate to conditions of modernity. Hajj 'Ali, whose own
159 marriages speak for his political acumen, sees only disadvantages
554 in the cousin-right marriage custom of the Bedouins. His
829 interest in getting on with the business of change, so to
582 speak, has led him to question a basic right contained in the Bedouin principle of lineage structure and corporate membership.

> A thing which I do not like about our customs is the idea that a man has a right to his uncle's daughter. The man binds his cousin and in the end he might not marry her and will be the cause of her never marrying. He gives himself the authority to decide whom she may or may not marry. If he knows she desires to marry a certain man, he says: "She can marry anyone but not that one."

[562] Here he challenges the traditional right of the individual male in Bedouin society, favoring the rights of the female.

[177] The emancipation of the female, especially in rights and
[178] duties concerned with the marriage contract, is an element
[562] of the modernization process in Egyptian society and the Middle East in general.

* 613 The bait, as a political group, is in part structurally
602 defined by the corporate principle which states that blood-kin
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* 613 602 571 682 at this lineage level must bear collective responsibility in matters of compensation and blood-revenge. This principle, as we have seen, is extended until the whole 'aiela is included in a symbolic expression of corporate group solidarity. In order for this expression to persist, of course, the mechanism, or ideology, of blood-revenge must be maintained. [124] All of my informants, though they disagreed over the details of revenge, insisted that it was the inviolable right of the 156 Arabs. But Hajj 'Ali took exception to the practice of blood- • 159 554 829 682 revenge for a number of reasons. He said:

> The world changes. Before it was only the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali and the Border Guards which kept order. The government now enters into the matter of killings. Personally, I do not agree with the custom and the way it operates. In the case of killing, for instance, someone who is not worth anything, and has no brains, kills one from another tribe. Then the tribe of the killer asks for the nazaala, and a third party becomes [178] involved. The third party agrees to guard the killer's bait for twelve months and the business of all those involved must stop. A member of the third party's family must accompany each member of the killer's tribe. But even after the twelve months one must live in fear at his own home, for after the twelve months the tribe of the deceased will try to kill the best man in the killer's tribe. How many good ones do we have in one tribe? I have heard that in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia the deceased man's family has the right to kill the killer only . . . (I then commented that perhaps blood-revenge functions to discourage killing in the desert.) But there are unbalanced people who actually commit murder just to tease their tribe: they have nothing to fear because no one is interested in killing them in retaliation.

In challenging the Arabs' traditional right to blood-revenge, Hajj 'Ali--besides questioning a structural basis of

156 the group--in effect questions a great deal about the whole
•159 traditional authority structure. Blood-revenge functions as
554 a deterrent to social disorder in that it represents an
829 automatic mechanism for restoring a balance of good relations
682 in the society. Actually, Hajj 'Ali exaggerated to make a
[182] point when he spoke of the existence of "unbalanced people."
682 A person would indeed be "unbalanced" who did not take into
672 consideration the repercussions of his acts with respect to
* 613 the personal danger and the dishonor and shame it would bring
to his 'aiela and bait. Although the 'aiela members are
willing to share in the blood money for accidental or unpre-
meditated killings, it is wrong to suppose that the Bedouins
do not attempt to weigh the justifiability and culpability
[671] in matters of killing. The very existence of the 'awaiyid
Awlad 'Ali argues against this. Obviously, the dichotomy made
between killing in the 'awaiyid, i.e., intentional and accidental,
and the concomitant gradation in compensation points to some
kind of reasonable consideration in cases of killing.

156 Hajj 'Ali is discontent with yet another aspect of
159 the traditional authority structure. He questions the logic
554 and authority represented in the oath as a sacred sanction.
695 This says something about the degree of secularization which
829 Hajj 'Ali has undergone. Although he does not say so, he
apparently favors a more secular and logical procedure for
determining a man's guilt or innocence.

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Another thing which I do not like about our old ways is the idea of swearing the oath. For instance, if I steal 1,000 L.E. from you, then you will accuse me. The 'aqila will then come to me and say: "If you did not steal the money, swear the oath." Some of my family will support me in this, swearing that I did not steal the money. The swearing of the oath will take place at a tomb, in the presence of the Quran. This tomb belongs to a dead man, and they tell you that he is a saint. First of all, the thief will swear the oath and then they will believe him; and, secondly, what is the sense of swearing in front of a dead body?

[784] Hajj 'Ali made no mention of God or of the Bedouin belief that misfortune will be visited upon the one who swears the oath in bad faith. There is an Arabic proverb which Hajj 'Ali repeated here which says in effect that "the thief will always swear."

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Hajj 'Ali actively challenges the traditional basis of the Bedouin moral and political community. Striving to do away with prescribed cousin-right in marriage and the mechanisms of blood-revenge and the oath as means of supporting law and order in al-Qasr is a course which we might expect from an Egyptian official who seeks to integrate the Bedouins into national society. And, in fact, these are all customs which the Governor believes must eventually be eradicated. It is not surprising that Hajj 'Ali's son believes that "it is not civilized" to lay claim to his cousin for, like his father, he also is redefining morality vis a vis "civilization."

It appears obvious in all that he says, including his comments at the Governor's reception, that Hajj 'Ali has

156 undertaken to transform his rajal khair role into an authority
159 which transcends the bounds of the local community. During
554 my talks with him, he never once insinuated that the people
829 of al-Qasr, nor even the 'Aishaibat or 'Ali Ahmar (terms
178 he rarely ever used), owe anything to a larger entity or
community known as "the Bedouin" or "the Awlad 'Ali."
If Hajj 'Ali is to legitimate his own authority in a new
political system, he must, at the same time, show the Bedouins
829 the legitimacy of the new political community. The Bedouins
178 must feel a moral commitment toward the new national political
179 community or else it has no meaning or authority. Most of the
Bedouins of al-Qasr still take it for granted that the alloca-
tion of political values and distribution of power in terms of
traditional and modern legal roles will be carried over into
the modern community and its politics. Hence, if anyone should
[634] go on to Cairo to represent the Bedouin of the Western Desert,
[648] naturally it should be the 'umda or the shaikh "who knew how
to deal with the Egyptians." The majority of the people of
the al-Qasr area see change coming but do not conceptualize
it as any threat to the traditional authority structure.

156 Hajj 'Ali anticipates the change as fundamental
159 enough to require a new sense of identity. I think this is
554 evident in the following statement in which he takes issue
829 with the traditional way of doing things and appears to be
178 preparing himself for a role in the readjustment process.
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There is another objection which I have concerning our customs. I mean the case of elections. For instance, one from the 'Aishaibat and one from the Sanagra, of the 'Ali Abyad, are nominated. Then, each man must vote for the one from his own tribe. He must vote for the 'Aishaibi even if the other is the better man. But, we should consider that the best man is the man with the best qualifications. 'Umda Ibrahim, for instance, knows how to greet an official or a minister, but he does not know the 'awaiyid nor the problems of the Bedouins. His brother (who will probably be the next 'umda) is a good man and is educated, but he does not know the 'awaiyid either.

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This view contrasts sharply with the traditional stand of most Bedouins in al-Qasr, including the members of the "status group." For instance, one 'aqila voiced what is a prevalent opinion when he said:

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If a man chooses to become a political candidate against a Bedouin, he must understand that the members of the tribe should and would vote for their 'umda because he is a member of their own tribe. Even if a man is crazy and his opponent has the highest college degree, the Bedouins must vote for the man from their own tribe.

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Hajj 'Ali is modern in his evaluation of the political situation here: a politician should know the problems of his constituents rather than follow principles based on traditional relationships. His motive is not to promote the 'awaiyid as a good way of life, for we know he does not think this to be the case. Instead, Hajj 'Ali believes that in order to help the Bedouins through a period of change one must know what they are changing from. Through his negative appraisal of

156 the 'umda, Hajj 'Ali seems to imply that he himself is capable
159 of understanding and leading the Bedouins during this period.
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178 Hajj 'Ali has formulated some positive and constructive
177 ideas relating to the period of transition which now faces
829 al-Qasr, and they are related to his analysis of the pressing needs of the day.

> The Bedouins need many things: they need factories as there are in the Nile Valley. For the desert, here in particular, we need olive presses. This will raise the profits of the farmer . . . We need
> [244] a factory for canning tomatoes, for the whole desert
> [489] plants them and the transportation is such that we cannot get them to the market . . . The biggest change in the desert results from the presence of 12,000 government workers; there were only 20 or
> [871] 30 before the World War. There were no schools, now there a few. You cannot find a six year-old boy who does not go to school; about thirty per cent of the girls in al-Qasr go to school also . . . Another cause of change is due to the fact that everyone now watches his neighbor, he sees what he
> [209] does and he imitates him. Today, I listen to the radio and tomorrow my neighbor buys one. Evolution
> [212] (tatawwar) is taking place, and the people here are realistic about it. For instance, I do not know reading and writing, and sometimes I must dictate a letter to my son . . . My son knows better than I, and I know better than my father did, who lived in al-Qasr for thirty five years without knowing anything about the streets of Marsa Matruh.

156 Hajj 'Ali is both subjective and objective about
159 change, as we can note from the comment about the radio.
554 In a non-doctrinaire fashion, Hajj 'Ali stresses the great
178 value of education while being aware of his own deficiencies
177 in this area. However, as a counterbalance, he seems to

imply that one cannot be educated and know the 'awaiyid at the same time--the attitude of a self-made man. Hajj 'Ali realizes his marginal position between the new and the old, and his attitude concerning change through education seems to be that of an unselfish leader. Elaborating further on the role of education, Hajj 'Ali showed insight into some of the psychological aspects underlying social change:

> As I said before, the people here are realistic about change. There are now only about three or four of us who send our sons to study at the university, the rest of the people are waiting to see what these boys will amount to. The other day, one of our educated boys, an officer in the army, came to visit al-Qasr. All of the women are now hoping to see their sons become as successful as this. This is exactly like the first time we cultivated olives in the desert: the Bedouins mocked those who planted the olive. After the olive began to show profits, everyone regretted that they did not cultivate it. Time is changing, and the people are changing. Education is the basis of everything in any nation. Now the agricultural engineer directs me, telling me what to do and how to do it . . . and before 1952 (pre-Nassar regime) they knew nothing about us and we had nothing.

As culture and social change proceeds in al-Qasr, it is evident that Hajj 'Ali and the national political community are becoming legitimate authorities in the eyes of the Bedouins. This is indicated by the following event. One month before I left the field, the first vice-President of the Republic was expected to visit the province of Marsa Matruh, and al-Qasr was named as one of the places which he would tour. Hajj 'Ali took it upon himself to set up three tents in the tradi-

156 tional style of Bedouin hospitality--"as we used to do in
159 Cyrenaica"--and spent a total of 50 L.E. for the welcoming
554 ceremony. "This money was from his own pocket," as the
829 Bedouins of al-Qasr complained after it was learned that
574 the vice-President would not visit Matruh after all. As
648 a matter of fact, all of the Bedouin leaders who had been
invited to the reception by Hajj 'Ali refused to eat the
food, for they said that it had not been prepared for them.
[576] This act was taken as a show of respect for Hajj 'Ali and
anger with bureaucrats.

156 Hajj 'Ali is the representative of al-Qasr to the
159 Arab Socialist Union which meets in Marsa Matruh and has
554 cell meetings in al-Qasr. The socialist cell in al-Qasr
648 meets about three times a month. When I asked why Hajj 'Ali
668 was the man chosen to represent all of al-Qasr at section
[124] meetings of the Union, the reply was: "Because he is a member
[635] of the Majlis al-Muhafza." There was one section meeting
of the Union in Matruh while I was in the field. The theme
of the meeting was "The Meaning of Socialism." Hajj 'Ali
attended this meeting.

156 In sum, it seems not too far afield to say that Hajj
159 'Ali is prepared to take over the leadership of the Bedouins
554 in a much more sophisticated manner than one could possibly
expect from the traditional style of politics. Hajj 'Ali's
[634] comments about the 'umda and the 'umda's probable successor

156 imply that he feels they are not really equipped to represent
•159 their traditional constituency. Hajj 'Ali, as everyone in
554 al-Qasr knows, is traditional and modern at the same time.
634 It seems that he has only alienated those whom he threatens and those who are a threat to him, i.e., the 'umda and the shaikh.

156 He may not be educated, but he knows the 'awaiyid;
159 at the same time he stresses the fact that his son will have
554 the education which he never had. Empathy is a primary trait
212 of the charismatic leader and the "cultural broker" who seeks to manipulate social relations. No one could explain to me why Hajj 'Ali did not have an education while his brother (who is only three years younger) and other members of the "status group" do read and write. He perhaps only became concerned in the period of change. Hajj 'Ali, the "cultural broker," is more politically conscious and creative within the context of two worlds in change.

156 [685] [439] equipment from the government projects and from smuggling sheep and merchandise across the Libyan border. Although some of these stories might be exaggerated, they all point to the fact that Hakim, despite his wealth, is not the most popular or reputable individual in bait Asabei', and that although Shei'eb is not a popular individual either, he definitely comes up the winner in any popularity contest between the two. The question is 156 613 558 682 683 why Hakim was selected by the Awaqil to replace Shei'eb. The case involved more than Shei'eb's inability to collect the money from members of his bait. Shei'eb's ineffectiveness seemed to have been taken as an excuse rather than as the direct cause. Many Aqaqil, before Shei'eb, had failed in collecting money from their own bait without being subject to direct challenge. What seems to be involved is more than a challenge to a particular member, Shei'eb. It is a challenge to the whole principle by which Shei'eb acquired his position as Aqila of bait Asabei': patrilineal succession.

156 159 613 463 683 554 [428] [779] Shei'eb is the youngest of four sons of the former Aqila of bait Asabei', Sheikh Elewa. For more than fifty years Sheikh Elewa was the undisputed Aqila of bait Asabei'. He also had considerable influence among other tribal segments throughout the whole of the Western Desert by virtue of his position as "nazzar", that is, the expert who assesses the amount of compensation for wound inflicted in a liable case. The position of nazzar is a hereditary one and had been handed down from father to son. The basis for his assessment of wounds are a number of old books believed to be obtained from Mecca and contain all the judgments of famous Islamic leaders in their assessments of wounds.

[428] Eleven years ago when Sheikh Elewa became blind and too old to

exercise his functions, he invited all the important people in the area into a large gathering during which he announced that he was handing the sacred books to Shei'eb, who was to become the nazzar and also to succeed him as the Aqila of bait Asabei'. Although at that time Shei'eb was fairly young, twenty-six, nobody questioned Sheikh Elewa's decision. "He is the Aqila," said one informant, "and he has the right to decide which of his sons is to succeed him. After all, he knows his sons better than anybody else and knows which one is best for the job." Most people thought that Sheikh Elewa, being still alive and with clear thinking, would help Shei'eb in performing his duties as Aqila. A few months after Shei'eb took over his father's position, it became apparent that he was too immature for the job. He tried to use his position to take money from members of his bait and when they refused to give him any money, he entered into fights with a number of them. Rumors spread that he took bribes from the disputing parties who came to him for him to assess the legal compensation for wounds to raise or lower his estimate. But still people within bait Asabei' as well as outside it respected Sheikh Elewa's decision and did not challenge Shei'eb openly. But as time passed the dissatisfaction with Shei'eb grew. This dissatisfaction came mainly from members of the Amar who were affected directly by Shei'eb's actions, especially those actions which resulted in the payment of compensation for wounds inflicted in fights.

PHASE II

On the evening of May 16, 1966, two members of the Geneishat tribe of Matruh area came to Burg-el-Arab with a large shipment of smuggled cigarettes to leave with their partner in the area, Hadi, from the

634 government." But due to the nature of the representation and the spe-
554 cific relation of the government to the area, the position of the omda
657 does not pose serious demands upon the loyalty of the omda to his tribal
[578] group.

634 Because of the omda's ability to bring benefits to his tribal seg-
554 ment from the government, the ability to manipulate the administrative
657 officials is the most important basis for the nomination of a given
666 individual for the position of the omda. "The omda is one who can speak city talk and knows how to deal with the government officials." Age is not important; young people know more about city ways than old people. "A man may be a cheat, but as long as he can get our things done, he is the best man for the job...of course, we don't want to nominate someone with a bad reputation who may blacken our face in front of everybody. However, if he has a bad reputation the council would not approve his appointment...he just has to be someone who can get things done..."

159 Muftah Mughaieb, the sheikh of the Sanagrah tribal segment in the
634 district of Haman, described the circumstances of his nomination as
554 follows:
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666 Before the former sheikh of that tribal segment died (he
578 was Muftah's uncle), one member of the group got into an argu-
625 ment with the police officer in charge of the police station in the district. The tribesman insulted the police officer who insisted on arresting him. Rumors also had it that the police officer was using his authority to reduce the share of the tribal segment in the government aid which was badly needed during that particular year. Sheikh Muftah, whose father is the Aqila of

159 bait Mughaieb of the Sanagrah tribe, went to the officer and apol-
634 ogized to him on behalf of the whole group and invited him to a
554 lavish dinner party. The charges against the tribesman were soon
657 dropped, and it was concluded that it was because of the way Muftah
666 had handled the situation. Since that incident, Muftah has been
[578] known as an expert in handling the government officials. One year
[625] later, the sheikh of the tribal segment died, and a meeting was held during which the important members of the Sanagrah tribal segment in the district decided to nominate Muftah for the position of the sheikh, vacant by the death of his uncle. Muftah, who was attending the meeting, was asked to accept the nomination, and he agreed. "...I accepted the nomination reluctantly." Muftah later told me, "I did not really want to become the sheikh. The
159 position does not bring any personal benefit, and it involves a
634 lot of responsibility. The sheikh has to act as an attorney for
554 his tribe, represent it to the government and competes with other
657 sheikhs to bring his people things that the other sheikhs cannot get for theirs, like more membership in the cooperative units or in the socialist union. And what does he get in return? Nothing... not even the gratitude of his people. To them, he is a servant of the tribe, and his duty is to look after its interest. If he doesn't, then everybody is quick to criticize him. I had to accept the nomination because I felt it was my duty to do so and not to embarrass the awaqil and the important people of the tribe who
[465] put their confidence in me. As far as the government, all I get is six pounds a month."

such compensation. In forfeiting her rights of inheritance, a woman secures for herself and her children the continuous support of her kin-group and the protection of her rights. This support was denied in the few cases I was able to collect in which the woman demanded her share of inheritance. The following is one of these cases. The material presented is a summary of the life history of Fatma, who at the time of the study, was a shopkeeper managing the small general store she owned near the railroad station of Burg el-Arab, some fifty miles west of Alexandria. She also practiced healing and midwifery on a part-time basis.

Fatma was the only daughter with four sons of sheikh El-Asi, who at one time was the aqila of bait Hussein of the Sanagrah tribal segment in the area. He was also known as a mardf and was frequently sought in mediation of disputes. He was believed to have supernatural power which he used to cure people for a certain amount of money. During his lifetime, he had acquired a sizable sum of money which he invested in livestock. At the time of his death his herd, which numbered more than 900 sheep and goats, was considered the finest in the area. He had no barley lands because his camp was deep in the desert, but he had fine grazing land.

Throughout the area the four sons were known for being arfogant and irresponsible. Three of them were employed by one of the irrigation projects carried on by the government in the area as construction workers; the fourth looked after the herd of his father. All four were known as chasers of women, and they frequently went to Alexandria to visit prostitutes and drink liquor.

Fatma was first married when she was eighteen to a man from Alexandria who had opened a general store in the area where her father

159 562 428 593 444 lived. Five years ago the husband died in a mining accident leaving Fatma with a ten-month-old boy. By that time, her father had been disabled, and her brothers wanted to manage her husband's store on her behalf. Knowing that her brothers were greedy, she refused and insisted that she take care of the store herself. The brothers objected on the grounds that it was not customary for a decent woman to be exposed to the customers in the store. When she insisted, the brothers threatened her. When the threats did not work, they beat her. After that, she [625] went to the police station in the area, filed a complaint against her brothers, and asked for police protection. The police officer in charge brought the brothers in and warned them that if they interfered with the store, not only would he arrest them, but he would also use his influence to get them forced from the irrigation projects where three of them worked. The threat worked, and they became friendly with their sister, buying things for the store whenever they went to Alexandria and sometimes helping in the store with her consent when she was on housecalls as a midwife. A year later Fatma was married for the second time to a 159 562 428 593 distant cousin; a few months later her father died. In a family meeting 233 that followed the funeral, Fatma made her announcement that she was claim- [587] ing her share of her father's herd. The brothers were angry and tried to beat her. But the older members of the bait who were present at the meeting stopped them and told them that Fatma had all the right to claim her share of the inheritance according to Awlad Ali ways and that there was [578] nothing that they could do about it. She was characterized in that meeting as "bint haram" (illegitimate child), an insult used to refer to those who show selfishness in their kinship obligations. When she left the camp with her share of the herd, this seemed to have severed

159 562 428 593 [237] the relationship between her and her brothers. Following her action and until the time of the study, they had never visited her and she had never visited them. Her husband took care of the herd; and the arrangement worked out all right until the 159 562 593 595 husband told Fatma one day that he was going to marry a second wife. She refused, but he went ahead with the marriage without her consent. He brought the new wife to live with Fatma in the same tin hut in which they were living. He started to pay more attention to the new wife and to neglect Fatma; whenever the latter complained, he beat her. Then, before one of the religious feasts, he sold two of Fatma's sheep and bought his new wife a dress and a silver bracelet. When Fatma objected [144] and they argued, he hit her with a stick on the head; she was hospitalized for a week with a serious head wound. While in the hospital, she went to her brothers who lived only two miles away, but they refused to 159 562 594 593 595 586 come to her assistance. She then went to sheikh Elewa (the aqila of Bait Asabei) and threw herself on him. He met with the husband and convinced him to divorce Fatma. He kept forty sheep of Fatma's herd as compensation for the mahr he had paid her and the marriage expenses, then took his new wife and moved from Fatma's hut. Fatma then returned and 159 562 444 [233] managed her financial affairs successfully herself. She managed the store and hired a shepherd to take care of the sheep. At the time of the present study she was respected by almost everybody in the area, including members of the local administration. She is known to be reason- [229] [524] able and of sound opinion, and her store functions as the meeting place for many of the tribal mi'ads and for casual conversations. She is also considered as a liason between the tribal population in the area and the local government administration, and is respected by both sides.

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This apparently is not a typical case, nor is Fatma by any means representative of a typical tribal women. It is a case of a marginal woman who had revolted against the tribal definition of a female role. She violated the customary ways of her society and claimed her share of her father's inheritance; and by doing this, she forfeited her right to protection by her brothers. She was able to do this because of her marginality which enabled her to draw upon sources of protection outside the tribal pattern, the police. It is interesting to note here that by doing so, she was not totally eliminated or ostracized from her society; rather, her role was redefined as that of a man, and she was treated as such.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

ment to which his teachings led, it may be said that the great difference between the Grand Sanusi and the earlier holy men whose tombs are homely landmarks all over Cyrenaica was that, while they were, all of them, in the eyes of the Bedouin, Marabouts, the Grand Sanusi was also the head of an Order which gave to him and his successors an organization. Moreover, unlike the Heads of most Islamic Orders, which have rapidly disintegrated into autonomous segments without contact and common direction, they have been able to maintain this organization intact and keep control of it. This they were able to do by co-ordinating the lodges of the Order to the tribal structure.

III

The more recent Islamic Orders are to be found principally in North and West Africa. The Sanusiya is one of the most recent of them. Its founder was an Algerian scholar, al-Sayyid Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi al-Khattabi al-Idrisi al-Hasani, a very remarkable man, mystic, missionary, and Marabout. The Sayyid Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi is usually spoken of in Cyrenaica as *al-Sanusi al-Kabir*, the Grand Sanusi, and I generally refer to him thus in this book.

The Grand Sanusi was born of a distinguished family of Sharifs at a village near Mustaghanim in Algeria about 1787. Early in life he became noted for his intelligence, piety, and profound learning, considered fitting ornaments to his noble birth. He studied first at Mustaghanim, then at Mazun, and later at the famous mosque school at Fez in Morocco, where he learnt theology, jurisprudence, exegesis of the Koran, and the other usual subjects of a Muslim student of the time. There he seems to have developed an interest in mysticism, having come under the influence of the Moroccan Order of the Tijaniya Darwishes. He left Fez when in the early thirties in order to make the pilgrimage to Mecca, though a Turkish biographer says that one of his reasons for leaving Morocco was to avoid possible unpleasantness with the authorities, who were alarmed lest his propaganda for the greater unity of Islam, his life's aim, might have political consequences.[1] They had small cause for alarm as his efforts seem to have made little impression on the

[1] Salim bin 'Amir, *Majallat 'Umar al-Mukhtar*, No. II, 1943–4, p. 2.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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people of Fez, but, if the story is true, the suspicion of those in authority would have been his first experience of the kind of opposition he was later to encounter in Cairo and Mecca.

He went from Fez to southern Algeria and thence to Qabis, Tripoli, Misurata, and Banghazi, preaching everywhere on his way. He had already gathered around him his first disciples (*Ikhwan*), mostly Algerians, and in their company he made his way to Egypt by the coastal route from Banghazi and stayed there a few weeks. He had intended to study at al-Azhar, but he seems to have aroused the jealousy of the Shaikhs of the University and to have irritated them by his reforming zeal and his speculations, and so departed for Mecca. Short though his stay in Cairo had been it is probable that the independence of the Khedive Muhammad 'Ali and the cultural and intellectual revival going on there left their mark on his mind.[1]

He remained in the Hijaz for about six years, studying under a number of Shaikhs at Mecca and al-Madina. He is said to have returned to Mustaghanim in about 1829 and not to have visited the Hijaz again till 1833. On this second visit, which lasted for eight years, he was accompanied by a considerable number of disciples from the west. He continued his reformist agitation and his studies under learned Shaikhs at Mecca. The man who influenced him most, and whose favourite pupil he became, was Sayyid Ahmad bin Idris al-Fasi, the fourth Head of the Moroccan Order of the Khadiriya or Khidriya Darwishes, a branch of the Shadhiliya Order, and later the founder of a new sub-Order of his own, the Idrisiya or Khadiriya-Idrisiya. Sayyid Ahmad Idris had aroused the hostility of the doctors of the Maliki rite at Mecca, by whom he was regarded as unorthodox, and went into exile into the Yaman, where he was accompanied for two years by the Grand Sanusi. On Sayyid Ahmad Idris's death in the Yaman, his two chief disciples organized his followers into two new sub-Orders, the Mirghaniya and the Sanusiya, the latter being organized and led by the Grand Sanusi, who established its headquarters at Mt. Abu Qubais, near Mecca, in 1837. This year is regarded as the official date of the foundation of the Order.

It will have been noted that the Grand Sanusi was influenced by a wide range of Sufi tradition and had affiliated himself to a

[1] Salim bin 'Amir, *Majallat 'Umar al-Mukhtar*, No. I, p. 12.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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number of Orders before he founded his own. It has been recorded that he was influenced by the Moroccan Tijaniya Order and that at Mecca he became the favourite pupil of the founder of the Idrisiya Order, which derived its tenets from the basic Shadhiliya Order. In his student days he became a member of other Orders: Shadhiliya, Nasiriya, Qadariya, and perhaps others.[1] His catholicism was not peculiar among the Sufis, and in his case he seems to have joined a large variety of Orders with the deliberate intention of learning their rites and doctrines at first hand so that he could combine all that was best in each of them in a new Order which would be the crown of Sufi thought and practice. It must not be supposed that on this account his teaching was a mere amalgam of the tenets of earlier Orders. Original it was not, but it was a consistent and carefully thought out way of life.[2]

The new Sanusiya Order made such rapid progress, especially among the Bedouin of the Hijaz,[3] that it excited the jealousy and fear of the various authorities in Mecca, the *'Ulama*, the Sharifs, and the Turkish Administration. There can be little doubt that the real objections to the Order were that it threatened the prestige and privileges of these authorities, but they were framed in less revealing language. It seems to have been held against the Order that it lowered Sufi standards to accommodate itself to Bedouin laxity in religious matters, and that it verged on heresy.

Faced with serious opposition the Grand Sanusi did what his teacher Sayyid Ahmad Idris had done in similar circumstances: he left the Hijaz, in about 1841, accompanied by many of his disciples, to return to his native land. After spending some months in Cairo, he continued his journey westwards to Siwa oasis, where he was taken sick and spent several weeks recuperating and instructing the people of the oasis in the faith. In the following year he reached Tripoli by the desert route. On his way to Qabis from that town he heard of the new French advances in his homeland and decided in view of them to return to Tripoli and thence to Banghazi. It would appear therefore

[1] Ibid., p. 6; Adams, op. cit., p. 22.

[2] Carlo Giglio, *La Confraternità Senussita dalle sue Origini ad Oggi*, 1932, p. 17.

[3] A. Le Chatelier, *Les Confréries Musulmanes du Hedjaz*, 1887, *passim*.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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that he did not choose Cyrenaica as his field of labour but was compelled to settle in Libya for a time because the road to the west was closed by the French and the road to the east by the authorities in Cairo and Mecca. The Grand Sanusi was a cosmopolitan, a townsman, and more at home in the schools and libraries of Fez, Cairo, and Mecca than amid the lentisk and juniper of the Cyrenaican plateau or the thyme and wormwood of its rolling plains. Even after founding in 1843 what has become the Mother Lodge of the Order, al-Zawiya al-Baida, on the central Cyrenaican plateau, not far from the ancient city of Cyrene, and while the Sanusi movement was still young in the country, he returned in 1846 to Mecca and stayed there till 1853. Altogether he spent only about ten years of his teaching life in Cyrenaica, whereas he spent some twenty years in the Hijaz.

On his return to Cyrenaica he seems to have felt the need for greater solitude. He was then nearing seventy years of age and doubtless felt that what was left to him of life should be given to contemplation, prayer, and study. It may be true also, as is commonly stated in books written by Europeans, that he desired to place a wide stretch of desert between himself and the Turkish authorities who, as the Sanusiya movement grew, began to take greater interest in it. He therefore first went to live for a short while at al-'Azziyyat on the southern edge of the plateau, where he built a zawiya, and afterwards at Jaghbub, about 160 km. from the sea.

Jaghbub, now to become the centre of the Order and the seat of an Islamic University second only in Africa to al-Azhar, was till 1856, when the Grand Sanusi made it his seat, an uninhabited oasis, in which the water was brackish, highly sulphurous, and insufficient to irrigate more than a small area of gardens. It was not a place for luxurious living, though it seems to have been healthy and, unlike Siwa, free from malaria; but it had certain political advantages. It was out of reach of the Turkish, French, or Egyptian governments, it was on the main pilgrimage route from North-west Africa through Egypt to Mecca, and this pilgrimage route bisected at the oasis one of the trade routes from the coast to the Sahara and the Sudan. Moreover, since Cyrenaica is a peninsula, it was the most central point he could have chosen at that time to be in equal

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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touch with the lodges of his Order in Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, the Western Desert of Egypt, and the Sudan.

In moving the seat of his Order to Jaghbub, the Grand Sanusi was probably most influenced by his decision to direct his missionary propaganda southwards. It is understandable that he should have made this decision. His was a missionary



The Spread of the Sanusiya in North Africa.

mind and the Order he had founded a missionary Order, and the pagan and semi-pagan countries of the Sahara and the Sudan, and of Equatorial Africa beyond them, offered endless scope for conversion to the faith. Moreover, his Order was already reaching the limits of its expansion in North Africa. It had won over the nomad and semi-nomad Bedouin tribes of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Egypt, and the oases folk under their influence, but was not making, and was not even in its heyday to make, much impression on the peasants and townsmen up against whom it now found itself in Northern Tripolitania and the Nile Valley. Dammed to west and east the Order

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poured its vitality southwards along the trade routes to the interior of Africa, into Fazzan and the various regions that are to-day called the French Sahara and French Equatorial Africa. Until France opened up the Atlantic seaboard, much of the Central African trade found its way along the oases-routes to the ports of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania and there were, therefore, well-established social connexions running from the Bedouin tribes of Cyrenaica and southern Tripolitania through the oases-dwellers to the tribes of the interior, for the nomads of Libya controlled the routes and to a large extent supplied the transport for the caravans. These connexions allowed an easy ingress to the Sanusiya. The two Cyrenaican tribes who chiefly traded with the Sahara, the Majabra and the Zuwaya of the oases of Jalu and al-Jikharra, had already been won over to the Order. The Zuwaya, who had date groves in the distant oasis archipelago of Kufra, over 700 km. to the south of Jaghbub, had already promised the Grand Sanusi a liberal donation of palms and water if he would build a zawiya there, and he had sent one of his followers to supervise the erection at al-Jauf of a lodge which became known as Zawiyat al-Ustad. Also, the Order had gained a foothold in the Wadai. While still a student at Mecca the Grand Sanusi had made friends with Muhammad Sharif, a prince of the Wadai, who in 1838 became Sultan of that country and furthered the interests of the Order there. It is said also that the Grand Sanusi bought a caravan of slaves on its way from the Wadai through Jaghbub to the coast and, having freed and educated them, sent them back to the Wadai as his missionaries.[1] The Order was also infiltrating from Mizda in southern Tripolitania, where a lodge was founded in 1845, and from the lodges in the oases of the Sirtican hinterland into Fazzan.

In Jaghbub oasis the Grand Sanusi set about the construction of his headquarters, a large mass of stone buildings, some of them two-storied, enclosing a mosque and school which were, for Cyrenaica, on an imposing scale. Around these central buildings and courts were the houses of the *Ikhwan*, many of them teachers in the school, of the students, of whom Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman says that there were over 300,[2] and of the Sayyid's family. There were also guest-rooms, quarters for the

[1] Duveyrier, op. cit., pp. 18–19.

[2] Op. cit., p. 88.

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slaves, kitchens, and wells. The oasis depression was studded with date palms and just outside the main entrance to the village were small irrigated gardens and wind-mills. The people had to use the brackish water for ordinary purposes, but sufficient fresh water for tea was obtained from infrequent showers by hollowing out cisterns in the rocks at the top of the western escarpment of the oasis.

The Grand Sanusi was not only a very learned man and a writer of distinction but also a bibliophile with a fine library of some 8,000 volumes,[1] mostly works on Islamic law and jurisprudence, mysticism, philosophy, history, koranic exegesis, poetry, and astronomy and astrology. Round him were many men capable of making good use of this substantial library. Indeed, it would have been difficult to have found anywhere in the Islamic world at that time, outside Cairo, a circle of better scholars. Poetry was one of the arts most cultivated at the oasis and I have been told by Arabs that it reached a high level of excellence. Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman, himself a poet, wrote that at Jaghbub one meets 'literary men of distinction, whose writings eclipse those of the poets of Iraq and of Andalousia'.[2]

The whole community at Jaghbub may have numbered round about 1,000, but it is not possible to make more than a guess at the figure. As the oasis produces little except dates, the supply problem must have been considerable, and we know that the Grand Sanusi kept herds of camels to the west of the oasis, where there is scrub grazing, and at al-'Azziyyat, to transport supplies from the coast. The community lived very largely on the surplus revenues, mostly goods in kind, sent annually by all the zawiyas of Cyrenaica.

The community was centred round the University. It was, in fact, almost purely a University society, and its importance as such in the history of the Sanusiya Order is very considerable. Here, under his personal supervision and the supervision of his disciples, far from worldly distractions, the Grand Sanusi was able to train the future leaders of the Order. The Shaikhs of the lodges of the Order were appointed by him from among his intimate circle of disciples, many of whom had followed him

[1] Duveyrier, op. cit., p. 24; Muhammad bin 'Uthman, op. cit., p. 88; Sir Richard Burton, *Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to al-Madinah and Meccah* (Memorial Edition), 1893, vol. ii, pp. 24–5.

[2] Op. cit., p. 88.

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from Algeria and the other countries of the Maghrib on his travels backwards and forwards to Arabia. He found in Cyrenaica a tribal structure of a simple kind on which it was possible to build a missionary organization, but not out of which it could be built. He brought this organization with him to Cyrenaica, a band of devoted followers whose allegiance had been tried by many vicissitudes. It must be remembered also that these intimates of the Grand Sanusi were foreigners to the Bedouin of Cyrenaica, with whom they had no ties of kinship, so that they stood always outside the tribal system and were not involved in the ancient loyalties and feuds inherent in Bedouin society. The missionary organization, the Sanusiya Order, was separate from the tribal system, and by centring it in the distant oasis of Jaghbub the Grand Sanusi prevented it from becoming identified with any one tribe or section of the country, as it might have become had it been centred in Cyrenaica proper. As we will see, it was the local attachment of the tribes to the zawiyas in their territories, and the attachment of the Shaikhs of these zawiyas to the Head of the Order, which made the Order so effective a missionary Body, and eventually enabled it to become a political force.

The Grand Sanusi died at Jaghbub on 7 September 1859 and was buried there. Later a magnificent shrine, furnished with ornate trappings, was erected over his bones and was surmounted with a white cupola, which gleams several miles away as one approaches the oasis. The shrine is of Egyptian craftmanship and seems incongruous in its desert surroundings and unfamiliar among a simple people.

There can be no gainsaying that al-Sayyid Muhammad bin Ali al-Sanusi was a great man and his life's work a great achievement. He is said to have been tall and of a distinguished appearance, an eloquent speaker, and a wise teacher.[1] His religious personality may be estimated by the fact that many Algerians, Tunisians, and Moroccans were so inspired by his teaching and example that they left their homes and followed him on his travels and at his orders went as missionaries into new lands, and by the fact that the Bedouin of Arabia and Libya, who are a reserved and unheeding people, accepted him as their guide in things both spiritual and temporal.

[1] Adams, op. cit., p. 10.

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The mere physical achievement of the man was remarkable. He had studied assiduously since he was a small boy in the Koranic school of his home and in other schools of North Africa and Arabia, and was still acquiring and sifting knowledge in his library at Jaghbub up to his death. He had taught in the schools in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, Egypt, the Hijaz, and the Yaman. Months of his life had been spent in travelling by the slow camel caravans of those days. He had thrice made the pilgrimage to Mecca. In spite of these activities he had found time to write a number of treatises. He had started his career as the head of a new missionary Order late in life—he was about 50 years of age when he founded his first zawiya in Arabia, and in the next twenty years he had made the Sanusiya the dominant Order in western Arabia and in North Africa from the Nile Valley to the borders of Tunisia and from the Mediterranean to the Sahara. When he died it was still intensifying its activities in the areas where it was already dominant, building everywhere new lodges, and was still expanding, mainly into the Sahara and the Sudan.

IV

When the Grand Sanusi died his two surviving sons, al-Sayyid Muhammad al-Mahdi and al-Sayyid Muhammad al-Sharif, were minors, so a regency of ten Shaikhs was appointed to control the affairs of the Order till the elder, Muhammad al-Mahdi, was old enough to take over their direction. When he did so he dealt primarily with the general affairs of the Order, leaving religious instruction in the hands of his brother.

The Grand Sanusi had been typical of the great itinerant teachers of his day: international in outlook and intent on the pursuit of holiness and learning rather than guided by secular distractions and ambitions. Mecca was the centre of his world and to it he tended always to gravitate. The Sayyid al-Mahdi was more definitely a Cyrenaican. Born in 1844 in a cave at Massa, near the Cyrenaican Mother Lodge of al-Baida, he was brought up among the religious families of the country and among the Bedouin. He studied under his father, the erudite Moroccan Sidi Ahmad al-Rifi, Sidi 'Ali bin 'abd al-Maula, Sidi 'Umran bin Baraka, and others of his father's circle of pupil-

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savants, and later at Mecca. He is said to have been an eloquent and inspiring leader and he was evidently an able organizer. Unlike his father the Grand Sanusi and his nephew Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif he has left no writings behind and he seems to have had less interest than they in literature and speculation. He lived an austere life and was considered by his followers to have been a saint and worker of miracles as great, or greater, than his father.

The Order expanded considerably under Sayyid al-Mahdi's leadership, particularly into the Sahara and the Sudan, and its greatly extended missionary enterprises demanded his personal attention. The conversion of the heathen and semi-heathen tribes of these regions created political problems and the trading activities of the Order required organization. The trade routes through the Libyan oases to the coast had increased in importance since the rise of the Sudanese Mahdi in 1881 had closed the Nile route. Personal direction was difficult from Jaghbub, so in 1895 Sayyid al-Mahdi moved the seat of the Order to Kufra, a more central position than Jaghbub in the theocratic empire being slowly built up. He first went to live at the zawiya of al-Ustad but shortly afterwards built a new zawiya, in which he resided, on a site which became known as al-Taj. He departed from Jaghbub amid the lamentations of his followers, only some of whom he was able to take with him to Kufra, leaving the rest behind at Jaghbub, with his nephew al-Sayyid Muhammad 'Abid as his titular representative there.

There are few places in the world so remote as Kufra oasis, but it was at the centre of the Sanusi empire and the meeting-place of a number of important desert routes. Before Sayyid al-Mahdi made it the seat of his Order, Kufra had been little more than a watering place for caravans and the centre for the wandering Tibbu tribes of the region, though the Zuwaya of al-Jikharra went there each year to collect dates. It now became an emporium through which caravans were constantly passing and exchange was carried on. The Sanusiya profited both by directly engaging in trade and transport and through customs dues.

The little village of mud and palmwood houses at al-Taj also became a centre of religious life and propaganda. The missionary efforts of the Order intensified all over Fazzan and into

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the territories of Kawar, Tibesti, Borku, Ennedi, Darfur, Wadai, Kanem, Chad, the Azger, the Air, and Baghirmi. Its teachings were spread as far as Senegal. The work of organizing this propaganda fell largely to Sayyid al-Mahdi's two principal lieutenants. Sidi Muhammad al-Barrani operated in Kanem, where he founded a lodge at Bir Alali on the route to Chad and organized bands among the Aulad Suliman, Zuwaya, Majabra, Tibbu, and especially the Tuwariq, to oppose the advance of the French into Central Africa; and afterwards in the Borku. Muhammad al-Sunni, and his son al-Mahdi, operated in Bornu and Baghirmi, where he entered into relations, politically unfruitful, with the Sultans of those countries, and in the Wadai, where he strengthened the good relations existing between the Sultan of that country and Sayyid al-Mahdi. In 1899 Sayyid al-Mahdi transferred the seat of his Order to Qiru (or Quru) oasis, between Borku and Tibesti, to direct better its propaganda, to administer the extensive regions won to it, and to organize resistance to the French.

[114] It is sometimes said in European books that one reason why Sayyid al-Mahdi went from Jaghbub to Kufra was his desire to increase the distance between himself and the Turkish Administration of Cyrenaica, but I have not found any evidence to support this view. On the other hand there can be no doubt that he was alarmed by the military and political activities of the French, about which he seems to have been well informed. The French were hastening to reach the limits of the sphere allotted to them by the agreements with England of 1898 and 1899 about the partition of Central Africa. In January 1902 they seized Bir Alali (Kanem) and destroyed the Sanusiya zawiya there. At the end of May, or at the beginning of June, in the same year Sayyid al-Mahdi died. His brother, Sayyid Muhammad al-Sharif, had predeceased him at Jaghbub in 1896.

In general the energies of the Sayyid al-Mahdi had been directed to the Sahara and the Sudan and the main events during his headship of the Order took place off the Cyrenaican stage. I have not thought it necessary, therefore, to give more than a brief summary of his career and of the political history of the Order in Central Africa. He saw the Order his father had founded rise under his direction to the height of its expansion

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and political importance. Except for two or three lodges founded after his death the distribution of the lodges shown on the map—two in Algeria, and some elsewhere which were not completed, are not marked—is that of 1902. All the Bedouin of Cyrenaica and of the Sirtica, and most of those in the Western Desert of Egypt, followed the Order and there was no part of these regions which had not established in it a Sanusiya lodge; and even in the towns of Cyrenaica it had an influential following in the more cultured administrative and commercial circles. In southern Tripolitania the Order had slowly increased its authority and advanced it to the west, while it was the dominant power in Fazzan and in the central Sahara. It had retained a powerful following among the Bedouin of the Hijaz.

After Sayyid al-Mahdi's death the fortunes of the Order declined. This was chiefly due to the attack on it by the powers of Europe whose greed for possessions in Africa and Asia was bringing them rapidly to disaster. For his part Sayyid al-Mahdi showed himself anxious to avoid any action which might enable these powers to accuse him of political designs. He wished only to be left alone to worship God according to the teachings of his Prophet, and when in the end he fought the French it was in defence of the religious life as he understood it. In its remarkable diffusion in North and Central Africa the Order never once resorted to force to back its missionary labours. Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman says of Sayyid al-Mahdi that the only orders he gave his followers were to pray and to obey God and His Prophet, that he avoided making any show of his power, considerable though it was, and that he held himself apart from political questions, fleeing from all considerations of that kind.[1] The Sanusiya Order co-operated with the Turks in the administration of Cyrenaica, although the Sanusi family and the Brothers of the Order disapproved of their way of life, but it resisted Turkish demands for assistance in their war of 1876–8 against the Russians. It refused the aid asked for by 'Arabi Pasha in Egypt in 1882, and by the Sudanese Mahdi in 1883, against the British. Sayyid al-Mahdi likewise rejected diplomatic overtures by the Italians and Germans. But when the French invaded its Saharan territories and destroyed its religious houses, and when later the Italians, also without

[1] Op. cit., pp. 118–19.

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provocation, did the same in Cyrenaica, the Order had no choice but to resist.

But though it was attacks from the outside which destroyed the theocratic empire of the Sanusiya, it may be considered doubtful whether in any case such extensive territories could have been maintained under single direction. The economic and political organization of the Order was crude, even when elaborated in the days of Sayyid al-Mahdi in response to increased trading activities and to the need of maintaining peace in the petty and barbarous states that had come under its influence. Its administrative machinery was at no time adequate for effective control over such wide domains, with their poor communications and their manifold tribal, racial, and cultural divergencies. To these weaknesses must be added, after Sayyid al-Mahdi's death, personal rivalries within the Sanusi family on the lines of which cracks began to appear in the loose empire, and it is probable that even if it had not been attacked by the Powers of Europe it would have broken up into a number of principalities, or spheres of religious influence, ruled by various members of the family. It might indeed be possible to sustain the thesis that it was the Italian occupation of Libya which prevented the complete break-up of the Order by rallying the outraged sentiment of the Bedouin to its side as the symbol of their common resistance to conquest and alien rule.

The administrative organization of the Order in the time of Sayyid al-Mahdi was simple indeed. Each lodge of the Order lived on its own revenues, derived from endowments, tithes, contributions of money, goods, transport, and labour, and sent its surplus to Jaghbub and Kufra for the maintenance of the University and of the Sanusi family and for the general purposes of the Order. The Shaikh of each lodge arbitrated in disputes in the district in which it was situated and could generally wield spiritual sanctions sufficiently weighty to compel acceptance of his awards. The Shaikh of a lodge was appointed by the head of the Order and was responsible to him. There was, however, so little centralized planning that new lodges seem occasionally to have been founded by the initiative of influential families without the head of the Order hearing of the new foundation till its completion. In the more distant parts

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the lodges were largely autonomous, or came under the control of a local Mother Lodge, such as Mizda in Tripolitania and Abu Qubais in Arabia. After the death of Sayyid al-Mahdi, a member of the Sanusi family sometimes installed himself as local director of the affairs of the Order, as Sayyid Muhammad 'Abid did in Fazzan. Without going into further detail it may be said that though central control existed it was cumbersome and that though there was an organization it was inadequate to deal with situations such as that which faced the Order on the death of Sayyid al-Mahdi, which demanded a rapid marshalling of its dispersed resources.

V

The dynastic situation which had formed after the death of the Grand Sanusi formed again after the death of Sayyid al-Mahdi: his surviving sons, Sayyid Muhammad Idris and Sayyid Muhammad al-Rida, were minors. The leadership of the Order therefore passed to Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif, son of Sayyid Muhammad al-Sharif, Sayyid al-Mahdi's younger brother; though for the first few years its political direction seems to have been largely in the hands of the experienced old Shaikh Ahmad al-Rifi, the last of the intimates of the Grand Sanusi and the principal adviser of Sayyid al-Mahdi.

Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif's leadership of the Order falls into three periods, from 1902 to 1912 when he was resisting the French in the Sahara, from 1912 to 1918 when he was in Cyrenaica directing the Bedouin against the Italians and the British, and from 1918, when he went into exile, to 1933, the year of his death at al-Madina in Arabia. It is only the second period with which this book is directly concerned and I will therefore summarize very briefly the events in the Sahara, leaving to a future chapter a more detailed account of the events in Libya which led to the Sayyid's appearance in Cyrenaica at the head of the Sanusiya Militant.

The French advance continued. After the loss of Bir Alali in 1902 Sayyid Ahmad moved his headquarters from Qiru back to Kufra, where he was protected by an immense desert and diplomatic immunity, since the British took the view that the oasis belonged to Turkey. In 1906 the French took Kawar and

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was left to it in these regions was the isolated oasis of Kufra. He had by his foolish attack on the British brought about the destruction of the lodges of the Order and of its political influence in the Western Desert of Egypt. Tripolitania had also been lost to the Sanusiya, though it was by this time almost entirely free from Italian domination. Ramadan al-Shtaiwi of Misurata barred its way into Old Tripolitania. Fazzan was in a state of anarchy. All that remained to the Order was its original North African core—the tribes of Cyrenaica and its Cyrenaican lodges—for in spite of all their defeats and miseries the Bedouin of the country still remained loyal to the Order whose interests were their own. The Italians were very far from having conquered these Bedouin and the history of the Order from the time of Sayyid Ahmad's departure is identical with the history of their continued resistance to the Italians under its leadership, first by diplomacy, then again by arms. With its empire and its dependence on the Sultanate the Order lost also its religious character and became, through its exclusive identification with the interests of the people of Cyrenaica, an almost purely political movement.

Although there were for many years rumours, greeted with great enthusiasm by the Bedouin and with nervous apprehension by the Italians, of Sayyid Ahmad's impending return to Cyrenaica he never again set foot on the African continent. Born in 1873, Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif was still in the early forties when he left for Turkey. He was described at this time as a man of medium height, stout, for an Arab on the dark side, with a firm and determined face adorned with a small moustache, close-cut whiskers on the upper jaw, and close-cut beard.[1] The Sayyid was obstinate, impulsive in his judgements and impetuous in his actions, and he seems to have been proud, quarrelsome, and fanatical. He was not prepared to compromise, and the British and Italians were in entire agreement that no understanding could be reached with him. But he was a pious Muslim and a brave and loyal man, tenacious of his beliefs, stubborn in his upholding of them against overwhelming odds, and dignified in their defeat. There was a certain wildness in his schemes and recklessness in his execution of them which compel admiration.

[1] Admiralty War Staff, Intelligence Division, 26 May 1915.

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After his departure from North Africa, Sayyid Ahmad continued to lead an adventurous life. His wars against France, Italy, and Great Britain had made him a world figure, and in the eyes of Muslims one of the foremost fighters for Islam of his time. He was much sought after by the pan-Islamists of Istanbul, who wished to use his name in their propaganda directed to bringing Turks and Arabs more closely together. In April 1921 he was designated King of Iraq at the Assembly of Angora, but Faisal, backed by the British, had the advantage of him in this project. He and his name played a big part in persuading the Muslim minorities of Turkey to throw in their lot with Mustafa Kamal. After Mustafa Kamal's victories Sayyid Ahmad returned to Istanbul, where he tried to re-establish the Caliphate, a project for which Mustafa Kamal showed less enthusiasm. Early in 1922 we find him at Urfa making peace between the great Bedouin tribes of Shammar and 'Anaza. We then find him at Marsina trying to reunite Syria to Turkey. From there he went to live at Damascus. The French found his presence in Syria embarrassing and expelled him from the country in December 1924. Thence he went to the Hijaz, where he remained till his death at al-Madina on 10 March 1933. During the last years of his life he took less interest in politics. He seems to have won the personal respect of King Ibn Sa'ud, and he was called upon to settle local disputes, the most notable of his achievements as peacemaker being a settlement of the quarrel between the Amir Idris of 'Asir, the descendant of the Grand Sanusi's teacher at Mecca, and the Imam Yahiya of the Yaman, but he mainly lived in retirement among his books. He lived just long enough to see the Sanusi cause to all appearances as finally extinguished in Cyrenaica as it had been elsewhere.

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by the Assembly of Sirt had forwarded to Sayyid Idris the *madbata*, dated 28 July 1922, formally investing him with the Amirate of Tripolitania. 175* 648* 795* 793

Sayyid Idris still hesitated. Before giving a reply he wished to consult Bedouin opinion, for it was on the Bedouin he would have to count were hostilities to break out. To this purpose he called, in October 1922, a large tribal gathering at Jardis al-'Abid. In the following month, under great pressure from his advisers, and still hesitating in his own mind, he accepted the Amirate. It must by this time have been apparent to him that the Italians intended to make war whatever course he took and that he might, in that case, just as well have the Tripolitanian Arabs as allies. In his reply to the Committee he entrusted Tripolitanian affairs to them, under their President Ahmad al-Marayid, until such time as a National Assembly could meet to draw up a constitution. Then, realizing that the fable of the wolf and the lamb was about to be enacted, he fled by caravan to Jaghbub in December 1922 and thence to Egypt, where he had long made financial preparation for this eventuality out of the Italian subsidies. He may also have felt that he had compromised himself so deeply with the Italians over a number of years that his presence in the country could only be an embarrassment to the Bedouin whose martial spirit he could understand but not emulate. He left his brother Sayyid Muhammad al-Rida and his cousin Sayyid Safi al-Din to represent him in Cyrenaica.

Sayyid Idris did not return to Cyrenaica till the third British occupation of the country during the late war (1943), though he continued in Egypt to represent the forces of resistance and, in so far as he could do so without compromising his position as a guest of a country whose Royal House was so intimately bound to the Royal House of Italy, to direct them. At the time of his flight he was 33 years of age. He gave the impression of being tall and rather portly, very unlike the slight and delicate figure he presents to-day. Nurtured, as were all the Sanusi family, in piety and learning in oasis retreats and accustomed to a refined and sedentary life, he has never been a man of action or of a hardy constitution. Though he assisted Sayyid Ahmad in organizing the Sanusi bands at Ajadabiya after the Treaty of Losanna in the first Italo-Sanusi war, he early showed that his 175* 648* 795* 793 159

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talents lay in diplomacy rather than in the field. It is evident from the part he played in the events leading up to the truce and during the period of the truce that he is astute and a man of sound political judgement. That he is often vacillating and evasive cannot be denied, and though these characteristics may sometimes have been a wise response of the weak negotiating with the strong, and may often have served him well in the difficult circumstances in which he took over direction of the Sanusiya Order from Sayyid Ahmad, they seem to be weaknesses to which he is temperamentally prone and to have become an aversion to directness in either thought or action. Italian writers, who are, with some justification, scathing in their comments on most members of the Sanusi family, speak of Sayyid Idris with respect. They admit that he is intelligent, religious, and gifted with a profound moral sense and political intuition. He is firm in decisions once he has taken them and keeps his promises.

At the end of 1922 the Fascist revolution culminated in the march on Rome and the new Government at once made up its mind to reconquer by arms Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. It continued to temporize in Cyrenaica, partly because its position at home was not yet secure, and partly because it intended to finish operations in Tripolitania first. The Fascists felt that their prestige was at stake. The days of *socialdemocrazia* were over and military conquest, domination, and colonization were the order of the day. The ancient Roman provinces were once again to be peopled by the sons and daughters of Rome.

On 6 March 1923 the Italians, without delivering an ultimatum or declaration of war, carried out their secret and long-prepared plan to seize the 'Mixed Camps' and the Sanusi camp of Khawalan, taking about half the Sanusi soldiers prisoners. By this surprise they put out of action a considerable part of the Amir's regular forces. In a proclamation of 1 May 1923 the new Governor of the Colony, Gen. Luigi Bongiovanni—soldiers had replaced civil administrators—declared null and void all accords and conventions made between the Government and the Sanusiya. On the following day the Amir was informed of the step taken by a letter from the Italian Minister in Cairo. War had broken out again in Cyrenaica.

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Bedouin followed them at great sacrifice. They were combined in many of the Sanusiya Brothers.

The Shaikhs and Brothers of the Order, with few exceptions, played a prominent part in the war, both in the field and by keeping the Bedouin, submitted and unsubmitted alike, in a ferment. The Italian soldiers and administrators constantly complained that whenever the Bedouin were tiring of the struggle the Brothers of the Order urged them to continue it. It was their example and exhortations which made it something more than the usual piecemeal resistance of a barbarous people to colonial conquest or more than a succession of raids of the kind Bedouin have enjoyed for so many centuries. Their participation made it both a national and a religious movement. It did much also to establish the Sanusiya in the hearts of the Bedouin. Some of the best-known names of the resistance, like Salih Lataiwish, 'Abd al-Hamid al-'Abbar, Saifat and Muhammad bu Farwa, Husain al-Juwaifi, Brahim al-Fallah, Fadil al-Mahashash, and Qtait bu Musa, were those of Bedouin Shaikhs, but most of the leading figures were Sanusiya *Ikhwan*, men like 'Umar al-Mukhtar, Yusif bu Rahil, Khalid al-Humri, Sharif al-Mailud, 'Abd al-Qadir Farkash, Fadil bu 'Umar, Salih al-'Awwami, and Muhammad bu Najwa al-Masmari.

The indomitable Sidi 'Umar al-Mukhtar was the soul of the resistance and the struggle is always associated with his name as similar struggles against French aggression in Algeria and Morocco are associated with the names of 'Abd al-Qadir and 'Abd al-Karim. Sidi 'Umar, 'our irreducible enemy, the faithful and able servant of Idris, the heart and soul of the Cyrenaican rebellion', as Graziani called him,[1] was that rare combination of Bedouin and Sanusiya Shaikh. He was born about 1862 of the *'Ailat* Farhan of the Braidan section of the Minifa tribe of the Marmarica and was educated first at the Sanusiya school at Janzur and afterwards at Jaghbub. He was nominated by Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif Shaikh of al-Qasur lodge among the stubborn 'Abid tribe but only performed his duties there for two years before being summoned to Kufra to serve against the French in the Wadai. He returned to al-Qasur about 1906 and later took a prominent part in the first Italo-Sanusi war and in obstructing Italian penetration in the years of peace which

[1] Op. cit., p. 235.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

followed it. In 1923, when he was called to take the foremost part in the struggle, he was already over sixty years of age. He was a simple man, religious, courageous, contemptuous of worldly honours and success, and with singular tenacity and powers of physical endurance. It may well be true that, as is reported, Sayyid al-Mahdi said 'If we had ten men like 'Umar we would not need any more'.

IV

All the *adwar*, or guerrilla bands, on the plateau came under Sidi 'Umar's command and he signed himself *al-Naib al-'Amm*, the Representative-General (of the Sanusiya). Each Bedouin tribe, as in Enver's day, maintained its own guerrilla band, some 100 to 300 men strong. Towards the end of the war the guerrillas never numbered, all told, more than 600 to 700. Only a certain number of men could maintain themselves on the country and move through it with speed and secrecy. As in other guerrilla wars, the actual fighting was done by small bands of enthusiasts, whose success nevertheless depended on the goodwill of the whole population. The bands suffered very heavy casualties, but were maintained at strength by a constant stream of adventurous spirits from submitted and unsubmitted sections alike. Though each band was named after a tribe and its members were chiefly recruited from that tribe and fought in its territory, they were not entirely recruited from it and they might fight anywhere. In each tribal band there were a good number of volunteers from other tribes and a sprinkling of *Ikhwan*, Sudanese, and Tripolitanians. The 'Awaqir and Magharba had separate bands while the other tribal bands usually fought in pairs, Hasa–'Abaidat, Bara'asa–Darsa, and 'Abid–'Arafa. A Misuratan contingent formed a small band of its own which greatly distinguished itself in the fighting. Each band had a simple organization: a commander, a *qaimaqam* for civil affairs, a qadi for religious and legal purposes, a commissariat agent, and a number of officers, some of whom had been trained in Turkish regular units. Sidi 'Umar maintained discipline in the bands, and acts of pillage or personal vendetta were severely punished. Those of the guerrillas who possessed horses rode them. The rest went on foot. Each band had its Sanusi flag.